China’s Pacific Strategy Mirrors Japan’s Pre-War Playbook
In 1925, British journalist Hector Bywater published “The Great Pacific War,” a work of speculative fiction that eerily foreshadowed Japan’s military strategy in World War II. A century later, as China flexes its maritime muscle in the Pacific, Bywater’s prescient analysis offers a compelling framework for understanding how regional powers can systematically challenge established orders – and how history might be repeating itself in concerning ways.
Bywater predicted Japan would strike American forces in a surprise attack, seize Pacific islands as defensive perimeters, and wage a war of attrition. His fictional scenario played out with haunting accuracy sixteen years later. The detail with which he outlined Japan’s potential strategy, from naval tactics to geographic targets, demonstrated a deep understanding of both military capabilities and imperial ambitions. He even accurately predicted the use of aircraft carriers as the primary offensive weapon, the targeting of American bases in the Philippines, and the strategy of establishing island bastions throughout the Pacific.
Japan’s ascent as a Pacific power followed a calculated trajectory. After modernizing its military-industrial complex in the late 19th century, Japan joined Western powers in suppressing the Boxer Rebellion, demonstrating its capability to project force beyond its shores. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 provided diplomatic cover for expansion, while participation in World War I legitimized Japan’s status as a global power. This transformation from isolated feudal state to modern empire took less than fifty years – a timeline that bears striking resemblance to China’s own rapid modernization. The Meiji Restoration’s focus on industrial development and military modernization parallels China’s post-1978 reform era.
The post-WWI period saw Japan exploit opportunities amid Western distraction. The 1918 intervention in Siberia, ostensibly to counter Bolshevism, expanded Japanese influence on the Asian mainland. Domestic challenges like the 1918 rice riots drove military leaders to advocate for expansion as a solution to resource scarcity. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, Japan methodically fortified islands across the Western Pacific, creating a defensive ring that would later prove crucial in World War II. The military’s growing influence over civilian government gradually transformed Japan into a state where military and industrial interests became inseparable, much like China’s military-industrial complex today.
America’s ability to counter these moves was hampered by the Great Depression and isolationist politics. Japan seized this opening to invade Manchuria in 1931 and launch a broader war in China in 1937. The occupation of French Indochina in 1940 marked the final step before Pearl Harbour. Each move was calculated to test Western resolve while expanding Japanese influence, a strategy that succeeded until it finally provoked war. The Western powers’ preoccupation with economic recovery and European tensions created a power vacuum that Japan eagerly filled.
China’s contemporary strategy in the Pacific bears striking similarities. Like Imperial Japan, China has built its rise on a military-industrial foundation, with armed forces deeply embedded in economic planning. The absorption of Hong Kong marked a symbolic end to Western colonial presence, much as Japan’s actions in China challenged European imperialism. Beijing’s assertive stance toward Taiwan and its claims in the South China Sea echo Japan’s territorial expansionism. The modernization of the People’s Liberation Army Navy mirrors Japan’s pre-war naval expansion, with a focus on challenging American maritime supremacy in the Pacific.
Beijing’s island-building campaign in the South China Sea mirrors Japan’s pre-war fortification strategy. These artificial islands serve as unsinkable aircraft carriers, expanding China’s defensive perimeter while projecting power into critical shipping lanes. Through economic leverage and diplomatic pressure, China has worked to minimize Western influence in the region, particularly targeting traditional U.S. allies. The Belt and Road Initiative extends Chinese influence far beyond its shores, creating economic dependencies that can be leveraged for strategic advantage, while state-owned enterprises function as tools of national policy in a manner reminiscent of Japan’s pre-war zaibatsu conglomerates.
However, key differences exist. Unlike 1930s Japan, China possesses nuclear weapons and deep economic integration with the global economy. Its Belt and Road Initiative offers a sophisticated economic tool for expanding influence that Japan lacked. Moreover, China’s demographic challenges and technological dependencies create vulnerabilities Japan didn’t face. China’s economic power and global supply chain dominance provide leverage that Japan never achieved.
The most significant parallel may be in how both powers have tested international resolve through incremental challenges to the status quo. Japan’s step-by-step expansion went largely unchallenged until it was too late. China’s actions in Hong Kong, the South China Sea, and beyond follow a similar pattern of pushing boundaries while avoiding direct confrontation. Each move is calculated to fall below the threshold that would trigger a Western military response, while collectively advancing strategic objectives.
The question isn’t whether history will repeat exactly, but whether understanding these historical patterns can help prevent conflict. Bywater’s work reminds us that strategic ambitions often follow predictable paths. As tensions rise in the Pacific, his century-old insights offer a sobering reminder: the signs of impending conflict are often visible long before the first shot is fired. The key is whether we have the wisdom to heed these historical lessons.
This issue was discussed in the Aftermath section of